Roost and a conventional HSM.
Both keep keys out of reach. Roost also checks who allowed each signature, and it has no stored key to steal.
| Conventional HSM | Roost | |
|---|---|---|
| Before signing | Checks that the client is logged in | Checks who approved this exact content |
| Root key | Stored in protected memory | Regenerated from the chip's physical fingerprint, never stored |
| Who signs | One device | 2 of 3 chips from different manufacturers |
| A chip or line is flawed | The whole device is exposed | One vote of the two required |
| Backup domain | A domain secret carried by people | Pieces held by chips, shared only with multi-person approval |
| AI agents | Use an application's credentials | Own identity, limits and approvals |
| Key options | Many algorithms and modes, including weak ones | A short list of safe choices; weak modes are refused |
| Partitions | Often licensed separately | Included |
| Testing | Hardware or a cloud account | A simulator that runs the same rules |
| Audit evidence | Logs you export and assemble | Sealed records and signed reports, ready for auditors |
| Vendor access | Support procedures and recovery keys | No master PIN, no support key; nothing changes without your owners' passkeys |
| Client setup | A client package per server and certificate exchange by hand | One module file, one address, enrollment code once |
| Refusals | An error code | The rule that refused and what would allow the request |
Not a race on speed
Every Roost signature goes through a quorum of three chips. Roost competes on what it can prove, and adds boxes when you need more throughput.
Coming from another HSM?
We plan the move with you, key by key. How migration works
See Roost refuse an unapproved signature.
A 30-minute live demo with our engineers.